Morris Brinkerhoff, et al. and the Estate of Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff v. Walter K. Christensen, Conrad Christensen, Alexander J. Aerts, and Allen Forsyth : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Morris Brinkerhoff, et al. and the Estate of
Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff v. Walter K. Christensen,
Conrad Christensen, Alexander J. Aerts, and Allen
Forsyth : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Aron Stanton; D. Aron Stanton and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Carman E. Kipp, Robert H. Rees; Kipp and Christian, P.C.; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Brinkerhoff v. Christensen, No. 870364.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1726
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
DOC 
KF 
DOCKET NO- JL—LH~***U SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MORRIS BRINKERHOFF, et al., 
individuals and heirs of the 
Estate of Decedent 
JACQUELYN BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
WALTER K. CHRISTENSEN, 
CONRAD CHRISTENSEN, 
ALEXANDER J. AERTS and 
ALLEN FORSYTH, 
Defendants/Respondent. 
Case No. 870364 
Category 14b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
D. ARON STANTON 
D. ARON STANTON S. ASSOCIATES 
255 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7680 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ. 
ROBERT H. REES, ESQ. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
City Centre I , #330 
175 East 400 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
At torneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent Allen Forsyth 
*»> i 
J 1\ 
FEB 22 19S8 
^ 
•HE SUPREME 0>« RT '.M 'Hh FA * *\ OF "AH 
MORRIS BRINKERHOFF, 
individuals and heirs of the 
Estate of Decedent 
JACQUELYN BRINKERHOFF, 
PI a i nt i f f s7 Appe 11 ant s , 
vs. 
CONRAD CHRISTENS! 
ALEXANDER J . AERTS , ^ > 
ALLFN PORc-Y"1^ 
De f e nd a n t s / Re s p o n d e n t . 
C a t e g o r y 1 4 b 
RESPONw 
\-VJN b-i'AN TON 
, ARON STANTON & ASSOCIATES 
25 5 E a s t 40 0 S o u t h , S u i t e 101 
c
' a i t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
i l e o h o n e : / o 0 1 ^ 5 3 1 - 7 6 8 0 
CARMAN u
 f L . , . 
ROBERT H. , 3 , E S Q . 
KIPP AND C H R I S T I A N , P . C . 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n * - - " * 
C i t y C e n t r a , # H 
1 7 5 E a s 1 40 0 30i-i 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , ULd.i OH I . 
T e l e p h o n e : ' S O U ^ 2 1 - 3 ^ 3 
v e ^ p o n d e n ^ rtjLxcQ t o r s y t h 
A ; 
. i j ' L t i t r y f O t r 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 4 
C. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I 
PURSUANT TO §32-11-2, FORSYTH IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO DRAM SHOP LIABILITY 6 
POINT II 
PURSUANT TO §63-30-10(1)(I), 
FORSYTH IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT 12 
CONCLUSION 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES; Page 
Board of Granite School District v. Salt Lake 
Coun ty , 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983) 9 
Bouquet v. Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976) . . . 10 
Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety, 5 30 
P. 2d 161 (Cal. 1975) 10 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 
(Utah 1971) 9 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 5 30 P.2d 799 
(Utah 1975) . . . 13 
Johnson v. Continental West, Inc., 663 P.2d 
483 (Wash. 1983) 10, 14 
Standi ford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980) 8, 13 
United States Brewers Assoc. Inc. v. Director 
of the New Mexico Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control, 668 P.2d 1093 (N.M. 1983) 10 
Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) 7 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. §32-11-1 et seq. 
(1953 as amended) 4, 6 
Utah Code Ann. §32-11-1 (1953 as amended) 2, 7 
Utah Code Ann. §32-11-2 (1953 as amended) 1, 2, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 
11, 12 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 et seq. 
(19 53 as amended) 13 
ii 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1953 as amended) 2, 13, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1953 as amended) 13, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(1)(i) (1953 as amended) . . 1,3, 12, 
14, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (1953 as amended) 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION; 
Constitution of Utah, Article VII, Section 3 . . . . 1 
COURT RULES: 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
45 Am Jur 2d Intoxicating Liquors, §§553 and 554 . . 7 
iii 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t A l l e n F o r s y t h ( F o r s y t h ) , by and 
t h r o u g h h i s u n d e r s i g n e d c o u n s e l , s u b m i t s t h e f o l l o w i n g b r i e f . 
JURISDICTION 
J u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s Cour t i s p r o p e r p u r s u a n t t o 
A r t i c l e V I I I , S e c t i o n 3 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of U tah , Utah Code 
Ann. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 (1953 a s amended) , and Rule 3 of t h e R u l e s of t h e 
Utah Supreme C o u r t . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The p r o c e e d i n g s below c o n s i s t e d of p l a i n t i f f s 1 mot ion 
fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment and F o r s y t h ' s mot ion for summary 
j u d g m e n t . The lower c o u r t g r a t e d F o r s y t h f s motion and den i ed 
p l a i n t i f f s 1 m o t i o n . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should t h i s Court affirm the t r i a l cour t ' s ruling 
tha t pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §32-11-2, Forsyth is not subject 
t o dram shop l i a b i l i t y and p l a i n t i f f s may not maintain the i r 
act ion against Forsyth? 
2 . Should t h i s Cour t a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g 
t h a t F o r s y t h i s immune from s u i t p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
§ 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) ( i ) of U t a h ' s Governmenta l Immunity Act? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s from Utah Code Anno ta t ed a r e 
c o n s i d e r e d d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h i s a p p e a l . The p r o v i s i o n s a r e s e t 
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forth below as they existed in July 1984 at the time the accident 
which gave rise to this action occurred. 
32-11-1. Liability for injuries resulting from 
illegal sale or other distribution of intoxicating 
liquors - Injured person's cause of action against 
intoxicated person or person who provided liquor -
Survival of action. (1) Any person who gives, 
sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating liquor to 
another contrary to subsection 16-6-13.1(8)(d)r 
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1)f section 32-7-14 or 
subsection 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby causes 
the intoxication of the other person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support 
to any third person, or the spouse, child, or 
parent of that person, resulting from the 
intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in 
subsection (1) of this section, shall have a cause 
of action against the intoxicated person and the 
person who provided the intoxicating liquor in 
violation of subsection (1) above, or either of 
them. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under 
this section dies, the rights or liabilities 
provided by this section shall survive to or 
against that person's estate. 
32-11-2. Immunity of statef state agencies and 
employees9 and political subdivisions. No 
provision of this act shall create any civil 
liability on the part of the state, its agencies, 
employees, or political subdivisions, arising out 
of their activities in regulating, controlling, 
authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the 
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
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chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee—Exceptions-
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. (1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission 
of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
. . . 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah 
National Guard. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action seeking damages resulting from the 
death of plaintiffs1 decedent, Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff. Jacquelyn 
Brinkerhoff was killed while riding a bicycle when struck by a 
vehicle owned by defendant Walter K. Christensen and driven by 
defendant Alexander J. Aerts (Aerts). Plaintiffs1 complaint 
sought damages against Aerts for negligent operation of the 
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vehicle and against defendant Walter K. Christensen and defendant 
Conrad Christensen, a passenger in the vehicle, under a theory of 
negligent entrustment. The complaint also sought damages against 
Forsyth pursuant to Utah's Dram Shop Act, Utah Code Ann. §32-11-1 
et seq. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants Christensens and Aerts settled with 
plaintiffs by payment of $150,000, and the case has been 
dismissed as to those defendants. Following that dismissal, the 
case continued solely against Forsyth. Plaintiffs filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment seeking a determination as to 
Forsyth's defense of governmental immunity. Forsyth filed a 
separate motion for summary judgment. 
C. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The motions were heard together by the trial court, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding. Forsyth's motion for 
summary judgment was granted and plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment was denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . At the time of the accident which forms the basis 
of this action, Forsyth was employed full time by the Utah 
National Guard as a mechanic at Camp Williams, Utah. He also 
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held a part-time evening job as a bartender at the Camp Williams 
NCO Club, a self sustaining instrumentatility of the State of 
Utah. (Record, at p. 77.) (The Record will hereafter be referred 
to as "R. , at p. ." ) 
2. On the evening of July 21, 1984, Forsyth in his 
employment as bartender served intoxicating liquor to defendant 
Aerts in the Camp Williams NCO Club. (R., at pp. 18 & 77.) 
3. Some time after Aerts left the Camp Williams NCO 
Club on July 2 1, 1984, the vehicle he was operating struck and 
killed plaintiffs' decedent. Aerts was found to have a blood 
alcohol content of .19. (R., at pp. 15, 16, & 77.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In 1981, the Utah legislature enacted the Dram Shop 
Act creating a previously nonexistent cause of action against one 
furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication 
of the person who was provided liquor. Section 32-11-2 of the 
Dram Shop Act excludes the state and its employees from that 
newly imposed liability where the liability arises out of the 
activities of the state and its employees in regulating, 
controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale 
of intoxicating liquor. Since the liability plaintiffs attempt 
to impose on Forsyth arises out of his activities while involved 
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i n t h e s a l e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r f F o r s y t h i s n o t s u b j e c t t o 
l i a b i l i t y and p l a i n t i f f s may n o t b r i n g t h e i r a c t i o n a g a i n s t h im, 
2 . The a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Utah N a t i o n a l Guard 
c o n s t i t u t e a " g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n " . While immunity from s u i t 
f o r t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of s t a t e employees has been wa ived , such 
immunity h a s s p e c i f i c a l l y been r e s e r v e d fo r i n j u r i e s a r i s i n g ou t 
o f t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Utah N a t i o n a l Guard . S i n c e F o r s y t h ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s were a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Utah N a t i o n a l Guard , he i s 
immune from s u i t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PURSUANT TO § 3 2 - 1 1 - 2 , FORSYTH IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO DRAM SHOP LIABILITY 
In t h e t h i r d c a u s e of a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s ' c o m p l a i n t 
a l l e g e s t h a t F o r s y t h i s l i a b l e f o r t h e d e a t h of J a c q u e l y n 
B r i n k e r h o f f p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of U t a h ' s Dram Shop Act 
t h e n in e f f e c t , Utah Code Ann. § 3 2 - 1 1 - 1 e t s e g . The t r i a l c o u r t 
r u l e d t h a t p u r s u a n t t o § 3 2 - 1 1 - 2 , F o r s y t h was n o t s u b j e c t t o 
s u i t . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g was c o r r e c t and s h o u l d be 
a f f i r m e d . 
The c a u s e of a c t i o n which p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e a g a i n s t 
F o r s y t h was unknown a t common l a w . P r i o r t o t h e e n a c t m e n t of 
U t a h ' s Dram Shop Act t h e r e was no c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t one 
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furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication 
of the person who was provided liquor. Seey Yost v. State, 640 
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) and 45 Am Jur 2d. Intoxicating Liquors
 f 
§§553 and 554. 
By enactment of the Dram Shop Act in 1981, the Utah 
legislature created a previously nonexistent cause of action. 
The first section of the Dram Shop Act, §32-11-1, contains the 
substantive provisions which statutorily created the new cause of 
action for dram shop liability. That section provides that any 
person "who gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating 
liquor to another", under certain circumstances, and thereby 
causes the intoxication of the other person is liable in injuries 
to any third person resulting from the intoxication. 
While §32-11-1 contains the substantive provisions 
creating the new cause of action, §32-11-2 contains a provision 
exempting the state, its agencies, employees, or political 
subdivisions from the newly created liability imposed by §32-11-
1. Section 32-11-2 states as follows: 
No provision of this act shall create any civil 
liability on the part of the state, its agencies, 
employees, or political subdivisions, arising out 
of their activities in regulating, controlling, 
authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the 
sale or other distribution of intoxicating liquor. 
(Emphasis added) 
The language of §32-11-2 excluding the state and its 
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employees from dram shop liability is broad. Section 32-11-2 
plainly states that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall 
create any civil liability on the part of state employees arising 
out of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing 
or otherwise being involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor. 
That language is broad and covers all activities where a state 
employee, acting in his or her capacity as state employee, is 
involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor. 
The legislature could have narrowed the scope of §32-
11-2 but chose not to do so. For example, one year earlier in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) 
this Court construed the term "governmental function", as used in 
the Governmental Immunity Act, to relate only to those 
governmental activities of such a unique nature that they can 
only be performed by a governmental agency or are essential to 
the core of governmental activity. Ibid at 123 6 and 1237. The 
legislature could have restricted the scope of §32-11-2's 
exclusion from dram shop liability by indicating that the state, 
its agencies, employees or political subdivisions were excluded 
from dram shop liability only when they were exercising a 
governmental function. However, the legislature did not so 
restrict the scope of §32-11-2. Instead it adopted broad 
language which manifests an intention to exempt from dram shop 
-8-
liability all state employees who, in their capacity as state 
employees, are in any way involved in the sale of intoxicating 
liquor. This Court must assume that each term of the statute was 
used advisedly and must give each term an interpretation and 
application in accordance with their usually accepted meaning. 
E.g., Board of Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983) and Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971). The language of §32-11-2 is clear; it 
exempts state employees involved in the sale of intoxicating 
liquor from the newly created civil liability imposed by the Dram 
Shop Act. 
The activities of Forsyth as a state employee fall 
squarely within the provisions of §32-11-2. Forsyth, a state 
employee, was involved, in his capacity as a state employee, in 
the sale of intoxicating liquor. Under those circumstances, §32-
11-2 mandates that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall create 
any civil liability on the part of Forsyth. The plain language 
of §32-11-2 allows for no other conclusion. 
Plaintiffs argue that the comments made by Senator 
Jeffs indicate a legislative intention that the exclusion from 
dram shop liability apply to the state and its employees only in 
their capacity "as liquor wholesalers". (Brief of appellants, p. 
6.) Plaintiffs1 argument is without merit for two reasons. 
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First, even if Senator Jeffs1 comments can be construed 
to indicate that he believed the exclusion protected the state 
and its employees only in their capacity as liquor wholesalers, 
those comments are not a conclusive expression of legislative 
intent. The intent of the legislature should be determined 
primarily from the legislation itself. See, United States 
Brewers Association, Inc. v. Director of the New Mexico 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 668 P.2d 1093 (N.M. 
1983). What may have been the intent of an individual legislator 
may not have been the intent of the legislative body who enacted 
the statute (See, Johnson v. Continental West, Inc. , 66 3 P. 2d 
483 (Wash. 1983)), and the views expressed by an individual 
legislator do not necessarily express the intent of the entire 
legislative body. See, Bouquet v. Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 
1976). Moreover, the statements of one legislator—particularly 
when those statements were made on the last day of the 
legislative session "when the Legislature was in a frenzy to get 
done with its business" (Brief of Appellants, p. 6)—should not 
be considered a reliable expression of the intent of the entire 
legislative body. See, Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety, 
530 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1975). 
Secondly, and in any event, the interpretation advanced 
by Forsyth and adopted by the trial court is not inconsistent 
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with the comments made by Senator Jeffs. Neither Senator Jeffs1 
comments nor the statute itself restrict the exclusion from dram 
shop liability to only liability arising from activities of the 
state or its employees in the wholesale liquor business. Had the 
Legislature intended so to restrict the exclusions, it would have 
been a simple matter to include some language indicating that the 
exclusion pertained only to activities relating to the wholesale 
distribution of liquor. The absence of such restrictive language 
and the inclusion of broad language indicating that the state and 
its employees are excluded from dram shop liability when they are 
"otherwise involved in the sale of intoxicating liquor" indicate 
an intention not to restrict the exclusion from dram shop 
liability as plaintiffs suggest. 
Plaintiffs argue further that if Forsyth's argument is 
accepted, absurd results will occur. They argue that if the 
provisions of §32-11-2 are applied literally, then merely as an 
incident of employment by the state, state employees would be 
entitled to immunity from dram shop liability, even with regard 
to activities outside the scope of state employment. Forsyth 
agrees that such an interpretation would be absurd. No such 
contortion of the language of §32-11-2 is required, however, to 
achieve a rational result and to give the language of that 
section reasonable effect according to its plain terms. 
-11-
The more reasonable interpretation of §32-11-2 is that 
it did not intend to provide state employees exclusion from dram 
shop liability in any context simply because they are state 
employees. Rather, the language of §32-11-2 indicates that the 
exclusion applies only as to those activities undertaken in the 
course and scope of employment as a state employee. Section 32-
11-2 states that no provision of the Dram Shop Act shall create 
civil liability on the part of state employees "arising out of 
their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or 
otherwise being involved in, the sale . . . of intoxicating 
1 iquor." 
Forsyth, in his capacity as a state employee, was 
"involved in the sale . . . of intoxicating liquor". 
Accordingly, under the plain language of §32-11-2, he is not 
subject to dram shop liability. The trial court's ruling 
granting Forsyth's motion for summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
PURSUANT TO §63-30-10(1)(i), 
FORSYTH IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
Forsyth's motion for summary judgment in the lower 
court was also based on the provisions of §63-30-10( 1 ) (i) which 
preserves immunity from suit for injuries arising out of the 
activities of the Utah National Guard. The trial court agreed 
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that §6 3—30 —10(1) (i) preserved immunity to Forsyth in this case 
and granted Forsyth's motion for summary judgment. The lower 
court's ruling was correct and should be affirmed. 
Section 63-30-10 is part of Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 et seg. The Act generally 
retains immunity from suit for governmental entities except where 
immunity is specifically waived by statute. See, Greenhalgh v. 
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). The Act retains immunity 
from suit for injuries resulting from the exercise of a 
"governmental function". In that regard §63-30-3 provides as 
follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function. . . . 
In the case of Standiford v. Salt Lake Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980), this Court established the standard for what 
constitutes a "governmental function" in the exercise of which a 
governmental entity is immune from suit. In Standiford the Court 
s ta ted as follows: 
[T]he t e s t for determining governmental immunity is 
whether the a c t i v i t y under consideration is of such 
a unique nature that i t can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that i t i s e s sen t i a l to the 
core of governmental a c t i v i t y . 
- 1 3 -
Id. at pp. 1236 and 1237. The Court later held that this test 
does not refer to what government may do but what government 
alone must do. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 629 P.2d 432, 
434 (Utah 1981). 
There can be few clearer examples of activities of such 
a unique nature that they can only be performed by a governmental 
entity or which are essential to the core of governmental 
activity than the activities of the Utah National Guard. 
Government alone has the responsibility and authority of 
assembling, training, and equipping a national guard. The 
activities of the Utah National Guard plainly constitute a 
"governmental function". 
As indicated above, the Governmental Immunity Act 
generally retains immunity except where specifically waived. One 
provision where such a specific waiver of immunity occurs is §63-
30-10. This section waives immunity from suit for injuries 
caused by a negligent act or omission or an employee. However, 
that section does not waive immunity for injuries arising "out of 
the activities of the Utah National Guard". Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(1)(i). Therefore, immunity from suit for injuries arising 
out of the activities of the Utah National Guard is preserved. 
Plaintiffs argue that Forsyth's activities do not 
constitute "activities of the Utah National Guard". Plaintiffs 
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construe that language too narrowly. Forsyth was employed not by 
some private club but by the NCO Club located at Camp Williams, a 
facility operated by the Utah National Guard. The club was 
provided specifically for the benefit, enjoyment, and relaxation 
of members of the Utah National Guard. It is not just another 
private club but is part of the overall function and operation of 
the Utah National Guard. Forsyth's activities while employed as 
a bartender at the NCO Club constitute activities of the Utah 
National Guard. Pursuant to §63-30-3 and §63-30-10(1)(i) Forsyth 
is immune from suit for injuries arising from those activities. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/respondent Allen 
Forsyth respectfully requests the Court to affirm the lower 
court's granting Forsyth's motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 1988. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
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